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Abstract: New York courts busily decided a multitude of land use cases in 2008 due 
to the increased growth in magnitude and complexity of land use issues.  This year, 
as in the past, the authors summarize some of the most important cases.  This 
year’s cases include the following topics: judicial deference to land use board 
decisions, zoning boards of appeals discretion, standard local practice, the New 
York State Environmental Quality Review Act, statute of limitations, affordable 
housing, and eminent domain.  
 
*** 
 
This column collects and describes over a dozen of the most significant and 
interesting land use cases decided by the New York courts since our end of the year 
report last year: cases that remind practitioners of important lessons or inform them 
about evolving trends. 
 
The first four cases strike important but familiar judicial themes: that the courts 
defer to good faith determinations by local legislative bodies, support strong 
enforcement practices by municipalities, will not tolerate bad faith practices on 
the part of municipalities, and affirm zoning amendments that conform to the 
local comprehensive plan.   
 
In Matter of Rossi v. Ballston, 854 N.Y.S.2d 573 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008), the 
landowners claimed that the town board’s enactment of a moratorium, revision of its 
comprehensive plan, and changes to its zoning were a pretext to preclude the 
construction of a Wal-Mart on their property.  The town board asserted that these 
actions were taken to allow for additional time to review and revise the existing plans 
to ensure the community’s interests and long term needs were being met.  The 
Appellate Court found that the petitioners did not meet their burden of proof to 
overcome “the strong presumption of validity” given to the town board’s adoption of 
local law.  
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In Beneke v. Santa Clara, 855 N.Y.S.2d 868 (N.Y. Gen. Term 2008), the court 
supported enforcement of a $200,000 fine where a property owner continuously 
disobeyed local zoning law.  In this case, the plaintiff proposed to build a two story 
boathouse on the shore of Saranac Lake.  After his application for a building permit 
was denied because his proposal did not conform with local zoning laws, plaintiff 
constructed a boathouse on floating pontoons.  After several proceedings and 
appeals, the plaintiff was given until June 1, 2007 to remove his boathouse.  When 
the plaintiff did not comply, the town instituted an action for sanctions under 
Executive Law § 382(2).  The court wrote: “[t]here are few weapons in a Town’s 
arsenal to deal with residents having deep pockets who are willing to flout local laws. 
This Town refused to capitulate to its well-financed adversary and it should not be 
left to innocent taxpayers to see their taxes rise or services diminish because 
someone had the financial wherewithal to wage a protracted battle.”  
 
In Downey Farms Development Corp. v. Cornwall, 858 N.Y.S.2d 542 (N.Y. Gen. 
Term 2008), due to bad-faith delays by the planning board in reviewing the 
subdivision application, the developer was awarded vested rights under the prior 
zoning law.  The local legislature upzoned the area encompassing the proposed 
development from one to two acres for single family residences.  The delays during 
the pendency of petitioner’s application were improper and because the developer 
showed that it was possible to have obtained approval prior to the amendment, its 
rights to subdivide under the one-acre zoning had vested.   
 
The importance of conforming zoning to the comprehensive plan is highlighted in 
Little Joseph Realty v. Babylon, 859 N.Y.S.2d 696 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).  The court 
found that zoning amendments did not constitute spot zoning as alleged.  Babylon 
amended its zoning to authorize hot-mix asphalt facilities as a special exception use 
in all industrial districts.  The amendments permit a use that is consistent with uses 
in the surrounding area, were not enacted for the benefit of a single owner, and are 
in conformity with the comprehensive plan.  The town board engaged in a thorough 
review of the amendments prior to their enactment and considered the community’s 
land use problems.   
 
In 2008 several important cases were decided regarding procedures and substance 
of awarding variances and interpreting the local zoning ordinance: 
 
Zoning Board of Appeals 
 
The issue of conformity with zoning regulations is within the jurisdiction of the zoning 
board of appeals (ZBA).  In Ashley Homes of L.I., Inc. v. O’Dea, 858 N.Y.S.2d 337 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2008), the planning board denied the petitioner’s subdivision 
application because the applicant had failed to meet the area requirements of the 
amended zoning ordinance.  Prior to the planning board’s determination, the ZBA, 
aware of the amendment to the zoning ordinance, granted the petitioner a one-year 
extension of a previous variance.  The variance, therefore, was still in effect at the 
time the planning board denied the petitioner’s subdivision application.  The court 
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held that since the planning board’s determination was based exclusively upon 
findings regarding the alleged nonconformity of the petitioner’s proposed subdivision 
with the zoning ordinance, which is within the jurisdiction of the ZBA, the planning 
board had usurped the power of the ZBA.  The court annulled the determination and 
directed the planning board to approve the subdivision. 
 
In Riverhead PGC v. Town of Riverhead & Harris v. Town Board of Riverhead, No. 
20504-07, 240 N.Y.L.J. 78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. October 6, 2008), the town board 
erroneously undertook to issue a use variance and an interpretation of the zoning, 
“both of which are solely within the province of the Zoning Board.”   
 
In London v. Huntington, 855 N.Y.S.2d 561 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008), the court held that 
a ZBA is not required to explain its departure from prior variances where the 
evidence establishes that the circumstances of prior variances were distinguishable.  
Ordinarily, “a determination of an administrative agency which neither adheres to its 
prior precedent nor sets forth its reasons for reaching a different result on essentially 
the same facts is arbitrary and capricious.”  Id. (quoting Tall Trees Const. Corp. v. 
Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Huntington 735 N.Y.S.2d 873 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2001)). 
 
In Allstate Properties, LLC v. Hempstead, 856 N.Y.S.2d 130 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008), a 
property owner brought an Article 78 action challenging the determination by the 
ZBA denying its application for area variances.  The court asserted that when 
determining whether to grant an area variance, a ZBA must, pursuant to Village Law 
§ 7-712-b(3), “engage in a balancing test weighing the benefit to the applicant 
against the detriment to the health, safety, and welfare of the neighborhood or 
community if the variance is granted” and consider five prescribed factors.  Here, the 
ZBA engaged in the balancing test and weighed the evidence corresponding to each 
of the factors.  As a result, the determination by the ZBA denying the area variances 
was rational and not arbitrary and capricious.  See also, Bull Run Properties v. 
Cornwall, 855 N.Y.S.2d 585 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008); Gallo v. Rosell, 859 N.Y.S.2d 
675 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008). 
 
Where a ZBA’s denial of findings are supported by evidence in the record and an 
applicant fails to present evidence to carry its burden of showing that the board’s 
determination was inconsistent with a prior determination based on essentially the 
same facts, the denied area variance is not arbitrary and capricious.  In Fagan v. 
Colson, 856 N.Y.S.2d 153 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008), the ZBA considered and weighed 
the factors set forth in Town Law § 267-b(3)(b).  “[I]ts reliance upon the specific, 
detailed testimony of a neighbor of the petitioner which was based on personal 
factual knowledge did not render the determination the product of generalized and 
conclusory community opposition.”   
 
The “special facts exception” will apply under circumstances where the local ZBA 
willfully and unduly delayed proceedings.  In Mamaroneck Beach & Yacht Club, Inc. 
v. Mamaroneck, 862 N.Y.S.2d 81 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008), the board was required to 
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apply prior zoning law (contrary to the general rule that the current law must be 
applied) because there was evidence that both a moratorium and subsequent zoning 
amendments were motivated solely by an intent to prevent the petitioners from 
constructing the proposed seasonal housing.   
 
Standard Local Practice 
 
In 49 East Maple Avenue, Inc. v. Loniewski, 854 N.Y.S.2d 757 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2008), the court quoted the Court of Appeals in holding that “42 USC § 1983 is not 
simply an additional vehicle for judicial review of land-use determinations.”  The 
court affirmed the lower court decision, which held that even if the denial of a land 
use permit is arbitrary and redressable by an Article 78 or other state law 
proceeding, it “is not tantamount to a constitutional violation under 42 USC § 1983; 
significantly more is required.”   
 
“’The evidence in this case presented a close, fact-specific choice of the kind that 
local boards are uniquely suited to make’ and where, as here, conflicting inferences 
may be drawn, it was the responsibility of the Board, not this Court, to weigh the 
evidence and exercise its discretion in approving or denying application for the 
subdivision plat.”  MLB, LLC v. Schmidt, 856 N.Y.S.2d 296 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008). 
 
Mandamus relief may not be awarded to “compel an act in respect to which the 
[public] officer may exercise judgment or discretion.”  Albano v. Islip, No. 28127-
2007, 240 N.Y.L.J. 35 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jul. 28, 2008).  Here, the petitioner brought an 
Article 78 proceeding to annul and reverse the decision of the town engineer and 
direct the issuance of a building permit, arguing that the engineer’s determination 
was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. The permit was denied due to 
an assessment by the town engineer that the construction would exacerbate 
drainage and flooding issues.  The court held that because “[b]oth §67 of the Islip 
Town Code and the grant by the Zoning Board of Appeals bestow discretion upon 
the Department of Planning and Development” mandamus relief was not available.   
 
In Annabi v. Yonkers, 850 N.Y.S.2d 625 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008), the court invalidated 
an ordinance that eliminated the necessity for a supermajority vote to take action 
that is contrary to a county planning board recommendation.  The ordinance was 
invalidated because the city failed to refer it to the county planning board as required 
by General Municipal Law (GML) § 239-m.  GML § 239-m requires that all zoning 
actions and amendments affecting real property within 500 feet of a municipal 
boundary be referred.  The court found that the invalidated ordinance, removing the 
supermajority requirement, affects the entire city, and thus is within 500 feet of a 
municipal boundary.   
 
 The Court of Appeals noted that, where there is reason to believe that a proposed 
structure may be used for an unlawful purpose, municipal authorities are not 
required to let the property owner build the building and see what happens.  Matter 
of 9th & 10th St. L.L.C. v City of New York, 856 N.Y.S.2d 28 (N.Y. 2008).  The court 
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held that seeking assurances that the building would be used as an educational 
dormitory, when the applicant failed to show any relationship with an educational 
institution, was prudent and not arbitrary and capricious.  This was not a case of 
mere possibility of a future illegal use.  
 
State Environmental Quality Review Act 
 
To have standing to assert State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) 
claims, a party must "demonstrate that it will suffer an injury that is environmental 
and not solely economic in nature".  In Widewaters Route 11 v. Potsdam, 858 
N.Y.S.2d 820 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008), a property owner brought suit challenging the 
local board’s issuance of a site plan approval and special use permit for retail 
development.  The board declined to require an easement to provide the plaintiff’s 
parcel with direct access over the subject parcel to an adjacent highway.  Plaintiff 
asserted that the project as approved would negatively impact its ability to develop 
its parcel in the future.  The court held that this injury is solely economic in nature.   
 
Statute of Limitations 
 
Legal causes of action challenging procedures followed by a town board in enacting 
a zoning ordinance are subject to a four-month statute of limitations pursuant to 
CPLR Article 78, while causes of action challenging the legal validity of the zoning 
ordinance itself are subject to a six-year statute of limitations.  Schiener v. Sardinia, 
852 N.Y.S.2d 538 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).  Here, a citizens group claimed that the 
zoning ordinance was inconsistent with the comprehensive plan as required by 
Town Law § 263.  The court found that the group was challenging the substance of 
the ordinance and the six-year statute of limitations applied.   
 
Affordable Housing 
 
On August 19, 2008, the Second Department Appellate Division affirmed the 
Supreme Court's May, 2007 ruling in Land Master v. Montgomery, which found the 
town's zoning unconstitutionally exclusionary after the town board had removed all 
multifamily uses from the ordinance.  Matter of Land Master Montg I, LLC v. 
Montgomery, 863 N.Y.S.2d 692 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).  The Appellate Division 
wrote, "Since the [town] failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to whether 
or not the challenged zoning was enacted without giving proper regard to local and 
regional housing needs and that it has an exclusionary effect, summary judgment 
was properly awarded to the plaintiffs based on allegations of exclusionary zoning." 
 
Eminent Domain 
 
In Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008), the plaintiff-appellants argued that 
the District Court erroneously overlooked substantial allegations that the public uses 
described by the defendant-appellees were mere pretexts for the use of eminent 
domain in the Atlantic Yards redevelopment project in Brooklyn and that the private 
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developer was the sole beneficiary.  The Second Circuit disagreed and held that 
there is “at least a rational relationship to several well-established categories of 
public uses, among them the redress of blight, the creation of affordable housing, 
the creation of a public open space, and various mass transit improvements.”   
 
 
